University of Lyon, ENS de Lyon, and GATE, France
IZA World of Labor role
Professor of Economics, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon
Applied micro and public economics, optimal income redistribution, tax competition
Positions/functions as a policy advisor
Expert, French National Council for Taxation (Conseil des prélèvements obligatoires)
Professor of Economics, University of Grenoble Alpes 2016–2017; Associate Professor of Economics, Uppsala University, 2011–2015
PhD Economics, EHESS, 2007
"Tax me if you can! Optimal nonlinear income tax between competing governments." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129:4 (2014): 1995–2030 (with E. Lehmann and A. Trannoy).
“Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective.” Social Choice and Welfare 39:4 (2011): 751–782 (with A. Trannoy).
“Optimal income tax under the threat of migration by top-income earners.” Journal of Public Economics 94:1-2 (2010): 163–173 (with A. Trannoy).
“Optimal nonlinear income tax and nonlinear pricing: Optimality conditions and comparative static properties.” Social Choice and Welfare 35:20 (2009): 199–220.
"Marginal deadweight loss when the income tax is nonlinear." Journal of Econometrics (Forthcoming) (with S. Blomquist).
This is a revision of the original article. Understanding how migration responds to tax changes will aid in setting the progressivity of a tax systemThis is a revision of the original article. Decreased transportation costs have led to the transmission of ideas and values across national borders that has helped reduce the barriers to international labor mobility. In this context, high-skilled individuals are more likely to vote with their feet in response to high income taxes. It is thus important to examine the magnitude of tax-driven migration responses in developed countries as well as the possible consequences of income tax competition between nation states. More specifically, how does the potential threat of migration affect a country’s optimal income tax policies?MoreLess